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Here is a company [Merrell Dow-the manufacturer of Bendectin] who 
has been in thalidomide, involved with thalidomide, and they know that the 
only animal that had the identical deformity to man was one species of 
macaque monkey . . . .  They never went to higher animals. Here's a com­
pany who knows all about thalidomide, yet they haven't got the money to 
go to higher animals . . . . I feel like there were certainly enough [adverse 
reactions of limb reduction in children born after their mothers had taken 
Bendectin to alleviate symptoms of nausea] reported, given our bad report­
ing system . . .  to have warranted some kind of acknowledgment of this on 
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the labeling and to physicians. I think I should have had the choice to make 
up my mind whether I wanted to take this drug based on the fact of what 
you had in your files and what the FDA had. Then if I wanted to go ahead 
and take it and take my chances, we wouldn't be sitting across from each 
other. But, it's not fair to you to have this knowledge, whether or not you 
have established in your minds this causal relationship, and not share it 
with the medical community and with the public who is going to be con­
suming this stuff. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In toxic tort litigation, causation is the rub. Plaintiffs have, in large part, 
been stymied by their inability to establish that toxic agents, no matter how 
potentially dangerous, were actually responsible for the harms they have 
suffered. Their difficulties in this regard have increased exponentially since 
the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phannaceuticals, 
Inc.2 With great frequency, plaintiffs have been unable to convince courts to 
admit expert testimony that a given agent was causally responsible for the 
plaintiff's injury.3 Courts and scholars are in sharp disagreement as to the 
wisdom of Daubert and whether it has been fairly applied.4 The authors of 
this Article are not of one mind on either of the above issues.5 This Article is 
I. Deposition of Plaintiff Elizabeth Mekdeci at 568-70, Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'I Labs., 
Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (M.D. Fla. filed Jan. 20, 1978) (on file with the authors) [hereinaf­
ter Mekdeci Deposition], aff 'd 711 F.2d 1510 (I Ith Cir. 1983). Mrs. Mekdeci was the first plaintiff 
to bring an action against Merrell Dow claiming that the Bendectin she had taken in the first trimes­
ter of pregnancy had caused her child to be born with limb reduction. 
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Even without the strictures of Daubert, described infra in text 
accompanying notes 7 to 58, plaintiffs would confront difficulties in establishing a causal relation­
ship between a toxic agent and resulting harm. Daubert has, however, raised the barrier to a 
plaintiff's ability to prove causation since it licenses courts to act as gatekeepers to exclude expert 
testimony that does not meet the criteria for admissibility set forth by the Supreme Court. Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 589-92, interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which was amended as of December 
I, 2000 "in response to Dauben'' and "the many cases applying Daubert." See FED. R. Evrn. 702 
advisory committee's note, 28 U.S.C. App. at 893 (2000). The new language at the end of Rule 702 
allows an expert to testify "if (I) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testi­
mony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." FED. R. Evm. 702. 
3.  See, e.g. , Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1197-1202 (I Ith Cir. 2002); 
Glastetter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 989-92 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Meridia Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797-809 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Nelson v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 92 
F. Supp. 2d 954, 966-73 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Pick v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1151, 1164-78 
(E.D. La. 1997); Kelley v. Am. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 877-83 (W.D. Tex. 1997); 
Grimes v. Hoffman-La Rouche, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 33, 37-39 (D.N.H. 1995); Wade-Greaux v. 
Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1476-85 (D.V.I. 1994). 
4. See Symposium, Expert Admissibility: Keeping Gates, Goals and Promises, 34 SETON 
HALL L. REv. I (2003). 
5. Professor Berger has been a vocal critic of the tendency of courts applying Daubert to 
confuse the issue of admissibility of expert testimony with the sufficiency of the evidence to estab­
lish causation. See Brief of Amici Curiae Margaret A. Berger & Jerome P. Kassirer in Support of 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 21-29, Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 ( I  I th Cir. 2002) (No. 
61-11965 BB and 01-CC); Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: 
The Impact of the Supreme Court 's Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & 
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agnostic as to the controversy swirling around Daubert and its progeny. We 
proceed on the premise that significant changes in the doctrine are not in the 
offing. Plaintiffs will continue to lose toxic tort cases because they will be 
unable to establish causation. This phenomenon would not be troubling if 
there were not a recurring pattern of drug cases in which: (1) the causal rela­
tionship between the toxic agent and plaintiff's harm is unresolved at the 
time of litigation and will likely remain unresolved; (2) the drug is not 
therapeutic but rather its purpose is to avoid discomfort or to improve life­
style; (3) it is almost certain that a patient made aware of the risk that is 
alleged to be associated with consumption of the drug would have refused to 
take it; and ( 4) the defendant drug company was aware of the potential risk 
or should have undertaken reasonable testing to discover the risk and failed 
to provide the requisite information to the physician or patient. 
We shall argue that the time has come for courts to recognize the right of 
patients to informed choice about risks associated with the use of a drug, a 
right that does not require plaintiffs to prove that the toxic agent was the 
cause of the plaintiff's harm.6 To do so we shall suggest a new paradigm for 
this informed choice cause of action that protects the right of patient auton­
omy, yet does not impose liability for the full extent of damages as would be 
the case when a plaintiff is able to prove causation. Absent recognition of a 
right predicated on informed choice, plaintiffs will be deprived of vital in­
formation necessary to make critical decisions regarding lifestyle drugs and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers will have little incentive to discover and warn 
about uncertain risks. With causation standing as a barrier to recovery, de­
fendants will sit back confident that liability is highly unlikely to attach to 
conduct that is admittedly negligent. 
CoNTEMP. PRoes. 289 (2001). Professor Twerski is in general sympathetic to Dauben and its prog­
eny but has cautioned against overly rigid application of the doctrine. See AARON D. TwERSKI & 
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 207 (2003); James A. Henderson, Jr. & 
Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and Technology in Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate 
Cause, 88 GEO. L.J. 659, 682 (2000). 
6. Several commentators including one of the authors of this Article have suggested that the 
role of causation ought to be eliminated or drastically altered in toxic tort cases. These proposals 
would permit recovery for the actual injury the plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of exposure to 
the toxic agent even though the plaintiff could not establish causation under traditional tort princi­
ples. See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of 
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 CoLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2142 (1997) (suggesting the elimination of the 
requirement of general causation and instead imposing liability on defendants for failing to ade­
quately test or disclose information regarding potential hazards to defendants subject to several 
defenses); Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 Tux. L. REV. 
I, 45 (1995) (arguing that when strong uncertainty regarding causation can be established, the bur­
den of proof should be shifted to defendant or defendant should be required to pay 50% of 
plaintiff's losses); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 773, 832 (1997) (proposing a presumption that an insufficiently tested product 
caused the plaintiff's harm); see also Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Uncertainty: Making 
Evidential Damage Actionable, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1941 (1997) (arguing that the burden of 
proof on causation should be shifted to the defendant when the defendant is responsible for eviden­
tial uncertainty). The focus of this paper is on recognizing and compensating for the deprivation of 
informed choice rather than compensating for the physical injury caused by the toxic substance. See 
authorities cited infra note 118. 
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This Article will first examine why it is that plaintiffs have been unable 
to prove causation under the Daub�rt guidelines in toxic tort litigation. Sec­
ond, it will look at the two existing models for informed choice litigation­
medical malpractice and products liability-and demonstrate why neither of 
these models gives toxic tort plaintiffs a fair opportunity to recover for the 
deprivation of patient autonomy against drug manufacturers who have 
breached their duty to warn of known or knowable risks. Finally, this Article 
will explore the elements of a causation-free informed choice cause of ac­
tion. It will suggest the appropriate standard for defining materiality of risk 
in informed choice where the goal is to protect patient autonomy, and hav­
ing established the substantive right to recovery, the Article will then 
suggest a measure of damages for depriving the patient of her right to 
autonomous decisionmaking. 
I. DAUBERT: T HE DIFFICULTY OF ESTABLISHING 
CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORT CASES 
A plaintiff who brings an action for the failure of a pharmaceutical com­
pany to warn about a material risk that allegedly caused her injury faces 
significant obstacles to recovery. A trilogy of cases decided by the U.S. Su­
preme Court dealing with the admissibility of expert testimony in the federal 
courts has made it very difficult for a plaintiff to successfully prosecute a 
toxic tort case.7 The three opinions-starting in 1993 with Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Phannaceuticals, Inc.,8 and continuing with General Electric 
Co. v. Joinel in 1997 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Cannichael10 in 1999-do not 
purport to deal with tort law. Ostensibly, they deal solely with the eviden­
tiary test a trial judge must use in determining whether an expert will be 
allowed to state an opinion. But the Daubert trilogy speaks very directly to 
the issue of what it takes to establish the causal nexus between wrongful 
defendant conduct and the harm suffered by the plaintiff-the crucial issue 
in each of the Supreme Court cases and in virtually all toxic tort litigation.11 
Before looking at what the courts have done post-Daubert and the con­
sequences therefrom, we need to consider briefly how much evidence 
7. Although Dauben and the Supreme Court's subsequent opinions in General Electric Co. 
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), interpret 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and as such apply only in federal court, a considerable 
number of states have also adopted Dauben. See David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The 
Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 355-56 (2004) (finding that nine states have 
adopted Daubert but noting that others have put the number at thirty-three). 
8. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
9. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
10. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
11. For commentary arguing that Dauben and its progeny transcend mere evidence and have 
had a profound effect on the normative rules of causation, see Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role 
in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of Legal Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 943 (2003), and Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Counhouse: How Trial 
Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Ton Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 335 (1999). 
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relevant to foreseeable risks and their causal consequences there is likely to 
be when a drug first appears on the market. The safety and efficacy studies 
done by manufacturers to obtain Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") 
approval will often provide inadequate data to prove the causal relationship 
between a toxic agent and the harm suffered by a plaintiff. The time frame 
for pre-marketing studies means that latent effects will not have had a 
chance to appear, the size of the studies is not sufficiently large to detect 
rare toxicities, the studies are conducted on a different population than the 
persons to whom the product will be marketed, the consumers who use the 
product once it is marketed may well be taking other medications that inter­
act with the new drug, and we as yet know little about the role genetic 
susceptibilities play. 12 Once the product is approved, the FDA lacks authority 
to require the drug manufacturer to undertake further research, and physi­
cians may prescribe off-label uses that have never been tested.13 Because of 
escalating budget cuts and a statutory shift to requiring swifter new drug 
approvals, the FDA's system of post-market surveillance has been drastically 
curtailed since 1993. Although the manufacturer is required to gather Ad­
verse Reaction Reports from a variety of sources that recount unusual or 
unanticipated toxicities in patients who are using the drug, 14 busy health 
providers infrequently make these reports which are crucial to identifying a 
problem. A former Acting Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administra­
tion stated, "It is popularly believed that less than 10% of the true adverse 
events are reported."15 At some point in time evidence may surface that a 
drug is causing one or more adverse reactions. But even if the evidence is 
sufficient for the FDA to remove the drug from the market or to warrant a 
warning about the drug's possible toxic effect, proving an actual causal con­
nection has been an uphill battle for plaintiffs post-Daubert. 
In Daubert, the chief controverted issue was whether Bendectin, an anti­
morning sickness pill taken by millions of pregnant women, could cause 
birth defects in their offspring, and had caused limb reduction in the plain­
tiffs. 16 The difficulty in establishing causation arose from the fact that there 
is a significant background risk of birth defects. The mere fact that a child 
was born with a limb reduction to a mother who had ingested Bendectin did 
not necessarily point to Bendectin as the cause of the birth defect. The court 
below, like many others that had granted judgments n.o.v. or summary 
judgments in Bendectin cases, found plaintiffs' expert testimony insufficient 
12. Michael A. Friedman, What ls the Value of an FDA Approval in a Judicial Matter?, 12 
J.L. & PoL'Y 559, 570-71 (2004). For a discussion of the impact genetic information may have on 
proving causation in toxic tort cases, see Gary E. Marchant, Genetics and Toxic Torts, 31 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 949 (2001). 
13. Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: 
An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA . L. REV. 181 (1999). 
14. Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 314.80-.81 (2003). 
15. Friedman, supra note 12, at 570. 
16. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS 
TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 221 (1996) (finding that approximately fifteen million live births 
occurred in which the mother was exposed to Bendectin during pregnancy). 
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to prove a causal connection, and granted summary judgment. 17 The Su­
preme Court first held that the Frey or "general acceptance" test-used by 
some federal courts in determining when expert proof was admissible-had 
not survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Instead, the 
Court told trial judges that they must screen all "purportedly scientific evi­
dence" on which an expert plans to rely to ensure that it is "not only 
relevant, but reliable."18 By reliability, the Court meant that the trial court 
had to ascertain whether the proffered expert's opinion was "ground[ed] in 
the methods and procedures of science."19 The Court then examined the 
characteristics of a scientific methodology and set out a number of nonex­
clusive factors for the trial court to consider that bear on "whether the 
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid."20 
Mentioned by the Court as indicators of good science are hypothesis testing, 
subjecting studies to peer review and publication, determining known or 
potential error rates, adopting standards for controlling the technique, and 
general acceptance of the methodology in the scientific community.21 The 
Supreme Court then reversed, leaving it to the court below to apply the new 
test on remand. 22 
Defendants immediately realized that Daubert furnished them with a 
new procedural opportunity, as they could make in limine motions asking 
17. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd 951 F.2d 
1128 (9th Cir. 1991). For an extensive discussion of the trial and appellate court decisions on Ben­
dectin, see JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 144-55 
(1998). For leading opinions denying recovery because expert testimony did not support a finding of 
causation based on the inability of plaintiff to establish causation, see, for example, Brock v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms .. Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989) (reversing judgment for plaintiffi; Lynch v. 
Merrell-Nat'/ Labs., 830 F.2d 1190 ( l st Cir. 1987) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defen­
dant); and Richardson v. Richardson-Merrel/, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986), aff 'd 857 F.2d 
823 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming judgment n.o. v. for defendant). 
18. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
19. Id. at 590. 
20. Id. at 592-94. 
21. Id. 
22. On remand, the court of appeals struggled with the new test set forth in the Supreme 
Court's opinion. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995), the court 
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. Judge Kozinski expressed skepticism about 
the ability of courts to fairly apply the Daubert criteria: 
[T]hough we are largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses 
whose testimony we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those experts' 
proposed testimony amounts to "scientific knowledge," constitutes "good science," and was 
"derived by the scientific method." 
The task before us is more daunting still when the dispute concerns matters at the very cutting 
edge of scientific research, where fact meets theory and certainty dissolves into probability. As 
the record in this case illustrates, scientists often have vigorous and sincere disagreements as to 
what research methodology is proper, what should be accepted as sufficient proof for the exis­
tence of a "fact," and whether information derived by a particular method can tell us anything 
useful about the subject under study. 
Id. at 1316. 
After expressing his frustration, Judge Kozinski concluded that the expert testimony proffered 
by the plaintiff was not sufficiently reliable to establish causation. Id. at 1319. 
November 2005) Uncertainty and Informed Choice 263 
the trial judge to exclude plaintiffs' experts as witnesses. In a traditional 
toxic tort action, if the motion is successful in excluding plaintiff's expert 
testimony on causation, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment be­
cause of the plaintiff's inability to prove a crucial element of the cause of 
action.23 That is what happened in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, a lawsuit 
brought against General Electric by a plaintiff who claimed that his expo­
sure to polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") and their derivatives had 
promoted his small-cell lung cancer.24 The district court granted the defen­
dant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's 
experts' opinions that PCBs caused small-cell lung cancer did not meet the 
exacting standards demanded by Daubert.25 The judgment for the defendant 
was, however, reversed by the Eleventh Circuit; it subjected the exclusion of 
the plaintiff's expert testimony to a stringent standard of review which the 
court found was required when the exclusion resulted in dismissal of the 
• 
26 Th S C d . ·27 action. e upreme ourt grante certtoran. 
Although it is Daubert itself that is the most cited case in the Daubert 
trilogy, it is probably Joiner that has had the greatest impact in toxic tort 
cases. In the first place, the Court rejected a strict scrutiny standard of re­
view and instead adopted an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing 
Daubert rulings.28 Trial judges were thereby given enormous control over 
the outcome of a case and considerable immunity from review; their deci­
sions would stand unless "manifestly erroneous."29 If the plaintiff's expert 
was barred from testifying about a material issue like causation, the case 
would never reach a jury, and would end instead with a grant of summary 
judgment for the defendant. Although grants of summary judgment are re­
viewed de novo,30 the exclusion of the expert-the crucial decision that led 
to the grant-would evade this strict standard of review even though the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the decision on expert testimony was 
"outcome deterrninative."31 
Second, in the course of finding that the district court had not abused its 
discretion in excluding the plaintiff's experts on toxicology and epidemiol­
ogy, the Joiner Court endorsed an approach that provided trial courts with a 
template for excluding expert testimony on causation. First, it approved the 
district court's finding that the animal studies on which the plaintiff's ex­
perts relied did not support the plaintiff's contention that PCBs contributed 
23. FED. R. Clv. P. 56(c). 
24. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997). 
25. Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 1994). 
26. Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529 (I Ith Cir. 1996) ("[W]e apply a particularly 
stringent standard of review to the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony."). 
27. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 520 U.S. 1114 (1997). 
28. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141--43. 
29. Id. at 142 (quoting Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658 (1879)). 
30. Joiner, 78 F.3d at 529. 
31. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142--43. 
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to his cancer.32 The Court pointed to differences between the studies and the 
facts of the litigation: the study subjects-infant mice-had been exposed to 
much higher doses of PCBs by a different mechanism of exposure, and the 
mice and plaintiff did not develop the same type of cancer. Furthermore, the 
Court observed that no study showed that PCBs led to cancer in any species 
other than mice.33 The Court brushed aside the plaintiff's contention that the 
issue for the Court was whether animal studies can ever be a proper founda­
tion for an expert's opinion. "The issue," said the Court, "was whether these 
experts ' opinions were sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which 
they purported to rely."34 
The four epidemiological studies on which the plaintiff's experts relied 
fared no better.35 The Court noted that the district court had rejected the first 
because the authors failed to find causation even though lung-cancer deaths 
of workers exposed to PCBs in an Italian plant "were higher than might 
have been expected."36 A second study, which also found a higher than ex­
pected incidence of lung-cancer deaths, did not count because the increase 
was not statistically significant.37 The third, which noted a statistically sig­
nificant increased rate of lung-cancer deaths in workers exposed to fluids 
that often contain PCBs, did not mention PCBs.38 And the fourth, which in­
volved a PCB-exposed group of Japanese workers who experienced a 
statistically significant increase in lung cancer, was faulted because the 
workers had also been exposed to numerous potential carcinogens.39 Conse­
quently, the Supreme Court found that the court of appeals had erred in 
reversing the district court's determination that the toxicological and epide­
miological studies "were not sufficient, whether individually or in 
combination, to support [the experts' ]  conclusions that Joiner's exposure to 
PCB ' s [sic] contributed to his cancer."40 
32. Id. at 144. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 145. 
Epidemiologic evidence identifies agents that are associated with an increased risk of disease 
in groups of individuals, quantifies the amount of excess disease that is associated with an 
agent, and provides a profile of the type of individual who is likely to contract a disease after 
being exposed to an agent. 
Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 333, 335-36 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 200 ); see also id. at 338-47 (describing dif­
ferent kinds of epidemiological studies such as randomized trials and various types of observational 
studies). 
36. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 145. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 145-46. 
39. Id. at 146. 
40. Id. at 146-47. 
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District court judges have found ample ammunition in the Joiner opin­
ion to support rulings excluding plaintiffs' experts on causation.4 1 Some 
courts, like the Joiner district judge who was found not to have abused her 
discretion, ignore statistically significant studies unless the authors found 
causation,42 despite the fact that researchers use a stringent scientific stan­
dard of proof that far exceeds the preponderance of the evidence standard 
that applies in civil litigation.43 Or they reject experts who rely on studies 
that lack a .05 level of statistical significance,44 without acknowledging that 
a lack of statistical significance does not mean that a study has no probative 
value.45 Or they disregard studies because of the possible presence of con­
founders, even though some studies are able to adjust for such factors.46 Few 
epidemiological studies cannot be attacked on one of the above grounds.47 
And courts have also rejected the relevance of animal studies to establish 
causation relying on the Supreme Court's emphasis in Joiner on the dissimi­
larities between animal studies and the litigation facts.48 One questions 
whether any trial judge who rejects or ignores an animal study will ever be 
reversed for doing so. The problem of extrapolating from animal species to 
humans will by definition exist; the animals'  dosage will always be much 
higher, and the method of exposure may vary considerably because one 
cannot ethically treat humans like laboratory animals.49 Furthermore, we 
know little as of yet about how particular substances are metabolized in hu­
mans and animals, or whether substances that affect health invariably cause 
the same effects in humans and animals. Because of these uncertainties, 
41. See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1314-15 & n.16 (I Ith Cir. 
1999); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1348, 00 Civ. 2843(LAK), 2004 WL 2884327, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2004); In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797-807 (N.D. 
Ohio 2004); Blanchard v. Eli Lilly & Co., 207 F. Supp. 2d 308, 314 (D. Vt. 2002) (discussing cases 
claiming that selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors caused suicide; in most, summary judgment 
was granted after defendant's successful Daubert motion); Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 
1062 (D. Kan. 2002), aff 'd, 356 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 2004); In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 
2d 1217, 1224-44 (D. Colo. 1998); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1396-414 
(D. Or. 1996); see also cases cited infra note 69. 
42. See, e.g. , Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 277 n.8 (5th Cir. 1998) (en bane) 
(approving Joiner analysis as "particularly relevant to our case . . . .  Dr. Brooks was unable to reach 
any conclusions."). 
43. Cohen, supra note 11, at 952-54. 
44. Raynor v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re Breast 
Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1226-27. 
45. Sander Greenland, The Need for Critical Appraisal of Expert Witnesses in Epidemiology 
and Statistics, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 297-301 (2004). 
46. Green et al., supra note 35, at 373. 
47. Id. at 337; In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1014, 1997 WL 230818, 
at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1997) ("[T]here is no such thing as a perfect epidemiological study."). 
48. E.g. , Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1238 (W.D. Okla. 2000), 
ajf'd 289 F.3d 1193 (I 0th Cir. 2002). 
49. Green et al. ,  supra note 35, at 345 ("animals can be sacrificed and their tissues exam­
ined"). 
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courts have been loath to permit experts to rely on animal studies, particu­
larly when epidemiological data are available.50 
Some trial courts have gone beyond Joiner. Although few courts say 
outright that epidemiological evidence is essential to prove causation,5 1 
many denigrate all other types of evidence, such as expert opinions that seek 
to establish causation on the basis of differential diagnosis,52 and dismiss 
Adverse Reaction Reports as mere anecdotal evidence not worthy of serious 
consideration on the issue of causation.53 Furthermore, even when epidemi­
ology shows an increased risk, some courts exclude expert testimony based 
on such studies unless the reported relative risk exceeds two,54 and courts 
generally do so without acknowledging that the treatment of relative risk "is 
a legal question, not a scientific question."55 
50. And when epidemiological data are not available, the court may conclude that the lack of 
concordance of animal data and human data means that there are insufficient grounds to extrapolate 
from the animal studies to humans. E.g., Fabrizi v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., No. 0 1 -289, 2004 WL 
1 202984, at *7 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2004). 
5 1 .  Indeed, courts often go out of their way to discuss in great detail that epidemiological 
evidence is not essential (in a case in which no epidemiological studies were done) before rejecting 
all the other evidence offered by the plaintiff. See, e.g., In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. 
Supp. 2d 79 1 ,  800-801 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Parlodel cases cited infra note 69. But see Haggerty v. 
Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1 1 60, 1 164 (S.D. Fla. 1 996), ajf 'd, 1 58 F.3d 588 ( I  I th Cir. 1 998), stating: 
[T]he generally accepted view in the scientific community is that [the expert's] methodology 
[case reports, spontaneous reports of adverse medical events collected by the FDA, and animal 
studies] can be used to generate hypotheses about causation, but not causation conclusions . ... 
[S]cientifically valid cause and effect determinations depend on controlled clinical trials and 
epidemiological studies. 
52. See In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1 348, 00 Civ. 2843(LAK), 2004 WL 
2884327, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1 0, 2004) (holding that differential diagnosis cannot be used to prove 
general causation); Edward J. lmwinkelried, The Admissibility and Legal Sufficiency of Testimony 
About Differential Diagnosis (Etiology): Of Under- and Over-Estimations, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 39 1 ,  
4 1 5  (2004). 
53.  See, e.g., Cloud v. Pfizer, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 1 8, 1 1 33 (D. Ariz. 200 1 )  ("[Case re­
p orts] are merely compilations of occurrences, and have been rejected as reliable scientific evidence 
supporting an expert opinion that Daubert requires.") (citing Jones v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 
894, 899-900 (N.D. Cal. 1 996)). The extraordinarily high burden that courts place on plaintiffs in 
satisfyi ng Daubert challenges is illustrated in one of the Parlodel cases, in which the court explained 
under what circumstances it would have allowed an expert to testify: 
This would be a different case if there was at least some support for the causal hypothesis in 
the peer-reviewed epidemiological literature, a predictable chemical mechanism, general ac­
ceptance in learned treatises and other scientific literature of a causal relationship, a plausible 
animal model, and dozens of well-documented case reports involving postpartum women with 
no other risk factors for stroke. In such a case, the totality of the evidence would be enough to 
satisfy the demands of Daubert. 
Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 1 3 1  F. Supp. 2d 1 347, 1 370 (N.D. Ga. 200 1 ), ajf'd sub nom., 
Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1 194 (I I th Cir. 2002). 
54. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1 3 1 1 .  1 32 1  (9th Cir. 1 995) remanded from 
509 U.S. 579 ( 1 993). 
55. Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, Relative Risk Greater than 1\vo in Proof of 
Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 4 1  JURJMETRICS J. 195, 202 (2001 )  (surveying cases); see also 
Vern R. Walker, Restoring the Individual Plaintiff to Tort Law by Rejecting "Junk Logic" About 
Specific Causation, 56 ALA. L. REV. 3 8 1  (2004). 
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Finally, there is the issue of transaction costs. Preparing for and litigat­
ing Daubert issues has undoubtedly made litigation even more expensive 
than before. For example, courts have noted that when a disease is relatively 
rare, a researcher may need a very large sample size to ensure that results of 
an epidemiological study are not simply due to chance.56 This may mean 
that sample sizes running into the hundreds of thousands or millions of pa­
tients may be needed to validate a retrospective study. 57 Prospective studies 
may be impossible to perform once a drug has been withdrawn from the 
market.58 Thus no matter what the ultimate bona tides of a case, cost may 
serve as an efficient deterrent to bringing a credible cause of action. As 
noted earlier, in this Article we take no position as to whether Daubert and 
its progeny have got it right. We simply report that proving causation in 
many toxic tort cases is well nigh impossible. In the ensuing Section, we 
consider whether the failure to establish traditional causation should negate 
a plaintiff's right to recover for the failure of a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
to warn of material risks. 
II. THE FORGOTTEN RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL 
CHOICE AND PATIENT AUTONOMY 
It is clear that in many toxic tort cases plaintiffs will not be able to over­
come the substantial burden of establishing that a suspected toxic risk 
actually caused their injuries. The failure to establish causation does not, 
however, mean that pharmaceutical manufacturers met their obligation to 
warn of potential risks that may result from the ingestion of their drugs. To 
establish fault in a negligence case, it is not necessary to prove that the fore­
seeable harm to the plaintiff is more likely than not to occur.59 The duty to 
warn is breached when a risk is of sufficient consequence that a reasonable 
56. See Brasher v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1 29 1 ,  1 297 (N.D. Ala. 2001); 
Globetti v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 1 1 1 F. Supp. 2d 1 174, 1 179 (N.D. Ala. 2000); Kelley v. Am. 
Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 880 n.8 (W.D. Tex. 1997). 
57. See cases cited supra note 56. 
58. Once a drug has been withdrawn from the market because it is considered too dangerous 
for human consumption, it would be unethical to subject humans to the risks of ingestion in pro­
spective controlled studies. E.g., Brasher, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1 297; Globetti, 1 1 1  F. Supp. 2d at 1 179 
n. 1 3. 
59. As one court explained: 
When the inquiry is upon an issue whether a certain alleged fact existed or happened in the 
past, it is not sufficient to prove only or no more than a possibility, however substantial the 
possibility may be . . . .  There the proof must establish the fact as a probability . . . .  But when 
the inquiry is one of forseeabilty, is as regards a thing that may happen in the future, and to 
which the law of negligence holds a party to anticipation as a measure of duty, that inquiry is 
not whether the thing is to be foreseen . . .  as one which will probably happen . . .  but whether 
it is likely to happen, even though the likelihood may not be sufficient to amount to a compara­
tive probability. 
Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams, 1 85 So. 234, 236 (Miss. 1938); see also w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 (5th ed. 1984). 
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person would warn against it.60 The Learned Hand risk-utility test requires 
that an actor take precautions to warn against even remote risks when the 
gravity of the foreseeable harm is great.61 That there be a causal nexus be­
tween the defendant's wrongful conduct and the harm suffered is a principle 
deeply ingrained in tort jurisprudence and we do not question that hoary 
maxim.62 However, in the context of toxic tort cases, to require that the 
plaintiff actually demonstrate that the toxic agent caused the plaintiff's harm 
flies in the face of the well-recognizec.t right of a patient to make an autono­
mous decision as to whether she wishes to expose herself to even an 
uncertain risk.63 The assault on autonomy is especially egregious in the case 
of lifestyle drugs where the drug has little therapeutic value. In such cases 
one can predict with a high level of confidence that a patient informed of the 
potential risk would almost certainly have opted against taking the drug and 
subjecting herself to the risk. 
Consider the following two examples. In 1956, the FDA approved the 
application of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., to market Bendectin as a treatment 
for morning sickness during pregnancy. 64 The drug was used by millions of 
women between 1957 and 1983 and was withdrawn by the manufacturer 
from the market due to widespread fears that it caused severe birth defects 
in the children whose mothers ingested the drug while pregnant.65 Parents 
brought actions on behalf of children born with limb reductions that the par­
ents attributed to B endectin. Plaintiffs introduced evidence of (1) in vitro 
(test tube) studies, (2) in vivo (animal) studies, (3) similarities between in­
gredients in Bendectin with chemical structures similar to known teratogens, 
and ( 4) retrospective epidemiological studies to support their contention that 
the drug caused the birth defects.66 After some early victories, the over­
whelming weight of authority both pre- and post-Daubert was that the 
evidence was too uncertain to allow for a finding of causation. 67 That the 
evidence was found wanting on causation does not mean that a reasonable 
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS§ 2(c) ( 1 998); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 363 (2000). 
6 1 .  See United States v .  Carroll Towing Co., 1 59 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
62. See generally ARNO c. BECHT & FRANK w. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION 
IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES ( 1 961) ;  DOBBS, supra note 60, §§ 1 66-69; Wex S. 
Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 ( 1 956); Richard W. Wright, Causation 
in Ton Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1 735 ( 1985). 
63. See discussion infra accompanying notes 78-94. 
64. Bendectin was the drug in question in Daubert. The history of the litigation and the 
scientific controversy about Bendectin is fully developed in two outstanding studies. See SANDERS, 
supra note 1 7 ;  GREEN, supra note 1 6. 
65. GREEN, supra note 1 6, at 9 1 ,  1 80 (finding that approximately thirty-six million women 
took Bendectin during the twenty-seven years it was marketed). 
66. Dauben, 509 U.S. 579, 580 ( 1 993). For an exhaustive discussion of the nature of the 
scientific evidence offered by the plaintiffs in the Bendectin litigation, see SANDERS, supra note 1 7 ,  
at 45-89. Sanders notes that many o f  the epidemiological studies that ultimately proved decisive 
were begun in response to the litigation. Id. at 79 (finding that the quality and quantity of studies 
improved dramatically from the mid- 1 970s to the mid-1980s). 
67. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 9 1 1 F.2d 94 1 ,  943 (3d Cir. 1 990). 
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person in a pregnant woman's position would not have wanted to have the 
information that Bendectin may be a teratogen before ingesting the drug. 
There is little doubt that the vast majority of expectant mothers suffering 
from the discomfort of morning sickness would have refused to take Ben­
dectin to alleviate their discomfort if told that the drug carried with it an 
uncertain risk of birth defects to their fetuses. 
A second example of toxic tort litigation that has generally failed be­
cause of the inability to establish causation between the drug and the 
resulting harm concerns Parlodel, an anti-lactation drug taken after child­
birth. Parlodel was approved by the FDA in 1980 to prevent post-partum 
lactation in women who could not or elected not to breast-feed their off-
• 68 sprmg. 
Following its approval, there was evidence that Parlodel was implicated 
as a possible cause of strokes .  Women who suffered strokes after ingesting 
Parlodel sought to recover for the failure of Sandoz/Novartis to warn about 
the dangers associated with ingestion of the drug. A majority of courts found 
that the evidence on causation did not meet Daubert guidelines.69 Adverse 
Reaction Reports were deemed too idiosyncratic and unreliable.70 Animal 
studies were given short shrift because one cannot accurately liken animal 
reactions to those of humans.7 1 Evidence that Parlodel, when administered to 
a patient, caused vascular constriction that receded when the drug was with­
drawn and then reappeared when the drug was introduced to the patient 
(dechallenge/rechallenge), was not sufficient because the patient did not 
actually suffer a stroke from the use of the drug.72 And finally, the epidemi­
ological studies were deemed inconclusive.73 As Adverse Reaction Reports 
began coming in from the use of Parlodel, the FDA sought to get Sandoz to 
issue warnings about the possible relationship of the drug and strokes.74 Par­
lodel was, however, a very lucrative drug and the company resisted for fear 
that it would cause a sharp decrease in its profits.75 In 1989, the FDA re­
quested that Sandoz withdraw Parlodel from the market for 
68. See Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 442 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
69. See, e.g., id. at 525-72; Dunn v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676-84 
(M.D.N.C. 2003); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1 046, 1048-53 (S.D. Ill. 
2001) ;  Shiharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 1 3 1  F. Supp. 2d 1 347, 1 35 1 -74 (N.D. Ga. 2001), aff 'd 
sub nom., Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp. ,  295 F.3 d  1 194 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2002); Glastetter v. Novartis 
Pharms. Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1 0 1 5, 1 0 1 7-46 (E.D. Mo. 2000), aff 'd, 252 F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 
2001) ;  Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 95 F. S upp. 2d 1 230, 1 233-39 (W.D. Okla. 2000), aff'd, 
289 F.3d 1 193 (1 1 th Cir. 2002). But see Brasher v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 1 60 F. Supp. 2d 1 29 1 ,  
1 299 (N.D. Ala. 2 00 1 )  (denying motion for summary judgment o n  grounds that expert testimony 
was reliable); Eve v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., No. IP 98-1429-C-Y/S, 200 1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 453 1 ,  
at *55-88 (S.D. Ind. March 7, 200 1 )  (same); Globetti v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 1 1 1  F. Supp. 2d 
1 1 74, 1 1 80 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (same). 
70. Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 46 1-65. 
7 1 .  Id. at 466-70. 
72. Rider, 295 F.3d at 1 1 99-1 200; Hollander, 289 F.3d at 121 1 .  
73. Shiharath, 1 3 1  F. Supp. 2d at 1 347; Rider, 295 F.3d at 1 197. 
74. See Eve, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 453 1 ,  at * 1 4-20. 
75. See id. at *17,  20, 28. 
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post-partum lactation. Its reason for doing so was that no drug, including 
Parlodel, was shown to be more effective than aspirin and breast support in 
alleviating the discomfort of the cessation of lactation.76 In short, Parlodel 
created gratuitous risk with very little benefit. It is hard to believe that a 
woman warned of the risk of strokes and told of the comparative safety of 
treatment by over-the-counter analgesics would opt to take Parlodel. 
One might expect that the right to informed choice would be worthy of 
protection whether or not a plaintiff could establish causation under the tra­
ditional norms of tort law. In both medical malpractice and products liability 
litigation, courts have sought to promote the right of patient autonomy by 
holding either the physician or drug manufacturer liable for failing to pro­
vide adequate information about risks associated with a medical procedure 
or a drug.77 Though these two developed bodies of law purport to recognize 
the right of a patient to informed choice, neither can serve as an appropriate 
model for recognition of a cause of action where the causal relationship be­
tween the uncertain risk and the plaintiff's harm cannot be established. 
A. Medical Malpractice: The Informed Consent Paradigm 
The right of a patient to informed consent has been a staple of U.S. 
medical malpractice law for over three decades.78 In order for a plaintiff to 
establish a prima facie case that she has been deprived of informed consent, 
she must show: ( 1) that a physician failed to disclose a material risk of the 
therapy undertaken or reasonable alternatives to it (materiality); (2) that the 
patient would have chosen against the recommended therapy (decision­
causation); and (3) that as a result of the therapeutic intervention the plain­
tiff suffered injury (injury-causation).79 The action for informed consent 
stands separate and apart from a claim that the physician was negligent in 
76. Id. at *26-29. 
77. See infra discussion accompanying notes 78-94. 
78. See Allan H. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 
4 1  M INN. L. R Ev. 3 8 1 ,  426-30 ( 1 957). Prior to the McCoid article, there was no mention of in­
formed consent in any of the major tort treatises. A California appellate court first coined the term 
"informed consent" in Sa/go v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 3 1 7  P.2d 1 70, 1 8 1  (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1957). As late as 1 964, Prosser made only passing reference to this cause of action, citing 
one case in support. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 107 (3d ed. 
1 964). Sporadic case law and commentary appeared during the 1960s. See, e.g., Shetter v. Rochelle, 
409 P.2d 74, 86 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 965), modified, 4 1 1 P.2d 45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 966); Natonson v. 
Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960); see generally Michael Justin Meyers, Comment, Informed Con­
sent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1 396 (1967). It was not until Canterbury v. Spence, 
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1 064 ( 1 972), however, that informed consent 
was pushed into the national limelight and became a popular theory for recovery. 
79. These three elements have been reiterated by numerous courts. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 
F.2d at 787-91; Williams v. Boyle, 72 P.3d 392, 397 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003); Barton v. Estate of 
Buckley, 867 So. 2d 27 1 ,  272 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); Grasser v. Kitzis, 553 A.2d 346 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1988); Scott v. B radford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979); see also DOBBS, supra note 
60, § 250 (setting forth five elements). 
November 2005] Uncertainty and Informed Choice 27 1 
either recommending or performing a given therapy.80 It assumes no opera­
tional negligence but instead focuses on the failure to deliver to the patient 
information about risks attached to the therapy.81 
Courts differ as to the standard that governs the determination of 
whether a risk is material such that it warrants disclosure to the patient. 
Some jurisdictions measure materiality based on what information a "rea­
sonable doctor" would provide. 82 Others refuse to cede to the medical 
profession the decision of what risks ought to be disclosed. Emphasizing 
that the heart of an informed consent right is patient autonomy, they opt for 
a "reasonable patient" standard to determine materiality. 83 With regard to 
causation, courts are also not in agreement. Some require that for the causal 
nexus to be met, a plaintiff must establish that a "reasonable patient"84 
would have chosen against the therapeutic intervention. Other courts take 
the position that if the patient herself would have chosen otherwise, causa­
tion is established.85 
Commentators have argued that requiring the plaintiff to prove what de­
cision would have been made had the material information been 
communicated to the plaintiff undercuts the goal of patient autonomy.86 The 
80. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of 
Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1 988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 6 1 6-17  ( 1 988). 
8 1 .  Id. 
82. See, e.g., Rush v. Miller, 648 F.2d 1075, 1076 (6th Cir. 198 1 ); Shetter v. Rochelle, 409 
P.2d 74, 86 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965), modified, 4 1 1  P.2d 45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 966); Fuller v. Starnes, 597 
S.W.2d 88, 89 (Ark. 1980); Williams v. Boyle, 72 P.3d 392, 398 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003); Ditlow v. 
Kaplan, 1 8 1  So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 965); Doe v. Chand, 781 N.E.2d 340, 347 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2002); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1 960), reh 'g denied, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 
1 960); Osburn v. Danek Med. , Inc., 520 S.E.2d 88, 91 (N.C. Ct. App. 1 999); Mitchell v. Kayern, 54 
S.W.3d 775, 779 (Tenn. Ct. App. 200 1 ). The reasonable doctor standard for materiality is mandated 
by statute in some states. See, e.g., N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2002); N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. § 440 1 -a (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2 1 . 1 3  (2003); see also Laurent B. 
Frantz, Annotation, Modem Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician 's Duty to Inform 
Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R.3d 1 008 ( 1 978). 
83. See, e.g. , Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 1 0  
(Cal. 1972); Ketchup v .  Howard, 543 S.E.2d 3 7 1 ,  378 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Mannina v. Borland, 869 
So. 2d 946, 953 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Jamison v. Kolgore, No. 2003-CA-00599-COA, 2004 WL 
614780, at *2 (Miss. Ct. App. Mar 30, 2004); Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of NJ., 800 
A.2d 73, 78 (NJ. 2002); Koapke v. Herfendal, 660 N.W.2d 206, 2 1 2  (N.D. 2003); State v. Breen, 
767 A.2d 50, 58 (R.I. 2001 ). 
84. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790; Fluck v. Coffman, 862 So. 2d 1 105 (La. Ct. App. 2003); 
Barton v. Estate of Buckley, 867 So. 2d 27 1 ,  272 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); Spano v. Bertocci, 749 
N.Y.S.2d 275 , 278 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
85. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Arena v. Gingrich, 733 P.2d 75 
(Or. Ct. App. 1 987); Kenny v.  Wepman, 753 A.2d 924, 926 (R.I. 2000); Wilkenson v. Vesey, 295 
A.2d 676, 690 (R.I. 1972). 
86. See, e.g. , PAUL s. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINI­
CAL PRACTICE 1 22 ( 1 987) ("By conditioning the availability of compensation on the congruence 
between the patient's own decision and what a so-called reasonable person would have decided, the 
objective test undercuts a patient's right of self-determination."). Other commentators have voiced 
similar criticism. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 79-80 ( 1 984); 
Richard A. Epstein, Medical Ma/practice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 87, 
1 2 1  n.72 ( 1 976); Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, 
Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE LJ. 683, 691 ( 1975); Marjorie 
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undeniable fact is that the patient was not provided with the information 
necessary to decide whether to undergo the therapy. The physician pro­
ceeded unilaterally. Though this argument is theoretically sound, as a 
practical matter the issue of decision-causation is rarely decided against 
plaintiffs as a matter of law.87 It is almost always given over to the sound 
discretion of juries. The requirement that the plaintiff establish the causal 
connection between the therapeutic intervention and the injury actually suf­
fered is almost never a matter of contention.88 Indeed, it is only when the 
plaintiff suffers from the undisclosed risk that the plaintiff is moved to bring 
suit. The damages for failure to provide informed consent are measured by 
the unwarned-against adverse outcome that the plaintiff suffered.89 
In the case of uncertain risk that is the hallmark of the cases in which 
Daubert forecloses recovery, the issue of decision-causation is rarely in 
doubt. As noted earlier, patients taking lifestyle drugs if informed of uncer­
tain risks that could have disastrous consequences, would most often choose 
against exposing themselves to them. However, as long as the law demands 
that injury-causation be proven, Daubert will block recovery whenever a 
plaintiff cannot establish that the toxic agent caused her injury. It matters not 
that the defendant was undeniably negligent in failing to warn about the risk 
so that the plaintiff could make an informed choice as to whether she wishes 
to subject herself to it. Unlike decision-causation, which is almost always a 
jury issue in medical malpractice cases and thus opens the path for recovery 
based on the denial of the right to make an autonomous choice, the injury­
causation issue in cases of uncertain risk will be decided for the defendant 
under Daubert as a matter of law, making Daubert an insurmountable bar-
Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 
2 1 9, 249-5 1 ( 1 985). 
87. The authors have yet to find a case where a court has directed a verdict for a defendant­
physician on the grounds that had the plaintiff been informed of a material risk, she nevertheless 
would have chosen the therapeutic intervention that caused her injury. 
88. But see Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 70 1 So. 2d 447, 452-53 (La. 1997) (holding that where 
patient insisted that surgeon use a surgical mesh in repairing his hernia and surgeon did not do so, 
the failure to do so was not the cause of patient's subsequent massive herniation). 
89. Courts regularly award plaintiffs damages for the adverse consequences suffered as a 
result of the failure of the physician to provide the requisite information necessary to make an in­
formed choice. Professor Richard Epstein notes that courts do not address the question of what 
might have happened to the patient if appropriate disclosures had led the patient to refuse the pro­
posed treatment. He argues: 
While it might be tempting to hold the physician responsible for the harm caused by the treat­
ment, that position is quite unsound if it does not take into account the harm that would have 
occurred in any event. Jn tort actions for harm caused to strangers, the plaintiffs preexisting 
condition is usually not an issue, since such plaintiff is normally of sound mind and body. In 
those cases where he is not, the accepted view, whenever apportionment is possible, is to allow 
recovery only for the additional harm that was caused by the tortfeasor's conduct and not for 
the total amount of harm experienced thereafter. For those patients (doubtless a significant 
proportion) who were not healthy at the outset of treatment, their precarious condition carries 
with it the substantial risk of further harm if prompt corrective steps are not taken. We are not 
talking of remote or speculative possibilities. In the medical context the possible reduction in 
damages required by the application of the rule is likely to be substantial in many cases and to­
tal in others. 
Epstein, supra note 86, at 1 2 1 -22; see also, TwERSKI & HENDERSON supra note 5, at 80-8 1 .  
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rier to recovery for the deprivation of informed choice. The maxim that 
there is no injury if there is no harm should not apply because the denial of 
the right to choose not to expose oneself to an uncertain risk violates a very 
basic human right of autonomous decisionmaking, yet it will receive no rec­
ognition under the existing medical malpractice informed consent paradigm. 
B .  Products Liability: The Informed Choice Paradigm 
In a parallel development, courts began recognizing an informed choice 
cause of action in drug cases as early as 1968. In Davis v. lt)>eth Laborato­
ries, Jnc.,90 the defendant manufacturer sold polio vaccine without warning 
of the risk that one person in a million would contract polio from taking the 
vaccine. The court held that the manufacturer had a duty to warn the con­
sumer of the risks involved and that the failure to meet this duty rendered 
the drug unfit and unreasonably dangerous within the meaning of § 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court stated: 
In such cases, then, the drug is fit and its danger is reasonable only if the 
balance is struck in favor of its use. Where the risk is otherwise known to 
the consumer, no problem is presented, since choice is available. Where 
not known, however, the drug can properly be marketed only in such fash­
ion as to permit the striking of the balance; that is, by full disclosure of the 
existence and extent of the risk involved. 
There will, of course, be cases where the personal risk, although existent 
and known, is so trifling in comparison with the advantage to be gained as 
to be de minimis. Appellee so characterizes this case. It would approach 
the problem from a purely statistical point of view: less than one out [of] a 
million is just not unreasonable. This approach we reject. When, in a par­
ticular case, the risk qualitatively (e.g., of death or major disability) as well 
as quantitatively, on balance with the end sought to be achieved, is such as 
to call for a true choice judgment, medical or personal, the warning must 
be given.91 
90. 399 F.2d 1 2 1  (9th Cir. 1 968). 
9 1 .  Id. at 1 29-30. 
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The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability92 has endorsed 
these grounds for liability and this position is supported by a substantial 
body of case law.93 However, the informed choice theory only triggers re­
covery if injury-causation has been established under traditional causation 
rules. Thus, it is only because plaintiff could prove that the vaccine actually 
brought about his polio that plaintiff was able to recover.94 Had plaintiff 
failed to establish injury-causation, the right to informed choice based on a 
drug manufacturer's negligent failure to warn would have been irretrievably 
lost. 
If indeed there is a right to informed choice, conditioning the right on 
proof that the harm was actually brought about by the defendant's conduct 
makes no sense whatsoever. If an uncertain risk of harm should have been 
communicated to the plaintiff so that the plaintiff could assess whether she 
wished to play this game of russian roulette, to then say that the plaintiff is 
not entitled to recovery because she cannot prove that the harm was actually 
caused by the suspect drug, renders the right to informed choice illusory. 
If the courts are truly committed to the principle of autonomous deci­
sionmaking, why is it that they have failed to see that insisting on injury­
causation sabotages the autonomy right? And why have plaintiffs' counsel 
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 2 cmt. i ( 1 997) provides: 
In addition to alerting users and consumers to the existence and nature of product risks so that 
they can, by appropriate conduct during use or consumption, reduce the risk of harm. warnings 
also may be needed to inform users and consumers of nonobvious and not generally known 
risks that unavoidably inhere in using or consuming the product. Such warnings allow the user 
or consumer to avoid the risk warned against by making an informed decision not to purchase 
or use the product at all and hence not to encounter the risk. In this context, warnings must be 
provided for inherent risks that reasonably foreseeable product users and consumers would 
reasonably deem material or significant in deciding whether to use or consume the product. 
Whether or not many persons would, when warned, nonetheless decide to use or consume the 
product, warnings are required to protect the interests of those reasonably foreseeable users or 
consumers who would, based on their own reasonable assessments of the risks and benefits, 
decline product use or consumption. When such warnings are necessary , their omission ren­
ders the product not reasonably safe at time of sale. Notwithstanding the defective condition of 
the product in the absence of adequate warnings, if a particular user or consumer would have 
decided to use or consume even if warned, the lack of warnings is not a legal cause of that 
plaintiffs harm. Judicial decisions supporting the duty to provide warnings for informed deci­
sionmaking have arisen almost exclusively with regard to those toxic agents and 
pharmaceutical products with respect to which courts have recognized a distinctive need to 
provide risk information so that recipients of the information can decide whether they wish to 
purchase or utilize the product. 
93. See, e.g., Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., 1 90 F.3d 1 2 1 3 ,  1 2 1 9  ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 999) (holding that 
purchaser of SUV should have been warned of rollover characteristics of vehicle allowing him to 
make an informed choice whether to take the risks warned against); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 
1 264, 1274 (5th Cir. 1 974) (holding that polio vaccine is unavoidably dangerous but defendant is 
l iable for failure to warn parents that vaccine may cause polio); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. 
Corp., 493 F.2d 1 076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that asbestos benefits may outweigh risk but 
defendant is liable for failing to give workers an informed choice as to whether they wish to expose 
themselves to the risk); Williams v. Lederle Labs., 591 F. Supp. 38 1 ,  383 (S.D. Ohio 1 984) (holding 
that beneficial but dangerous drugs must be accompanied by adequate warnings of risk); Cunning­
ham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1 377, 1 379 (Okla. 1 975) (same). 
94. See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1 280 (requiring plaintiff to prove that vaccine caused polio); 
Cunningham, 532 P.2d at 1 3 8 1  (finding that medical testimony established that plaintiff's polio was 
caused by vaccine). 
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not been vigorous advocates for the recognition of the autonomy right as a 
freestanding cause of action when faced with the reality that their cases are 
in jeopardy of dismissal on Daubert grounds? We believe that there are two 
reasons that courts and litigants have shied away from recognizing a causa­
tion-free autonomy right. First, they have not developed criteria for deciding 
materiality of risk in the autonomy-only paradigm. Second, without injury­
causation that defines the harm in concrete terms, they find themselves at 
sea in valuing the denial of the right to autonomy. Without some guidance 
on how to resolve these two questions, it is likely the courts will not recog­
nize or pursue the autonomy right. 
III. REDEFINING MATERIALITY FOR A CAUSATION-FREE 
INFORMED CHOICE ACTION 
In a causation-free informed choice cause of action, a prima facie case 
for liability is established when a drug manufacturer fails to warn about a 
material risk and plaintiff subsequently suffers from that undisclosed risk. 
The plaintiff makes out her case even if she cannot establish that the toxic 
agent caused her specific injury. Plaintiff bases her claim of informed choice 
solely on the grounds that defendant failed to disclose a material risk that 
warranted a warning by the defendant. What constitutes a material risk in 
the causation-free informed choice setting warrants careful attention. 
In the classic malpractice or product liability action in which causation 
must be established, the law can tolerate a vague definition of materiality. 
Regardless of whether the applicable materiality standard is what a reason­
able patient would expect to be told or what a reasonable doctor would 
reveal, the utilization of a fact-sensitive reasonableness test is counter­
balanced by the requirement that the injury was actually caused by the 
therapeutic intervention or drug. In the causation-free informed choice cause 
of action that we propose, the claim of failure to warn about a material risk 
is not buttressed by a finding of injury-causation. If causation-free informed 
choice litigation is to become a reality, we shall need to provide some direc­
tion to courts as to what factors they should take into account in deciding 
whether a risk is material. We do not suggest a litmus test for materiality. 
However, we do suggest that a scientific framework exists for determining 
risk, and that many of the factors spurned by courts under Daubert as insuf­
ficient to establish causation are highly relevant to the determination that a 
risk was of sufficient moment to deserve an informed choice warning. 
We begin by noting that whether a risk is of sufficient moment that a pa­
tient is entitled to know of it before ingesting a lifestyle drug requires an 
evaluation of information stemming from a host of sources.95 Even if these 
95. For prescription drugs the patient will learn of the risks associated with taking the drug 
from her physician. The overwhelming maj ority of courts requires only that the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer provide information regarding risks to the learned intermediary and not directly to the 
consumer herself. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)( l )  ( 1 997); see 
also In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 2 1 5  F. Supp. 2d 795, 806-12 (E.D. Tex. 2002) 
(comprehensively reviewing state law endorsing the learned intermediary rule). But see Perez v. 
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risk-related data do not suffice to establish legal causation, that does not 
mean that these data do not raise serious questions about the existence of 
substantial risks. At the moment a drug is prescribed, because of the lack of 
data, no one, including the manufacturer of the drug or device, may know 
whether the product is capable of causing harm.96 However, over time suffi­
cient signals may emerge to alert scientists that injuries may eventuate. 
Animal studies that are almost always challenged under Daubert because of 
the dissimilarity between both the dosages administered to animals and the 
biological differences between animals and humans may be highly probative 
as to the potential toxicity of a drug.97 Adverse Reaction Reports, regularly 
dismissed by courts as too sporadic and anecdotal to support causation,98 are 
viewed by scientists as enormously important in evaluating whether a risk is 
sufficiently credible to warrant an informed choice waming.99 Other evi­
dence that fails to impress judges at Daubert motions, such as evidence 
relating to the suspect chemical 's structural similarity to a known toxic 
agent, 100 in vitro studies, 101 or inconclusive epidemiological studies, 102 are all 
relevant to the issue of whether a risk worthy of warning is present. 
In dealing with each genre of scientific evidence on which plaintiffs' ex­
perts rely to prove causation, many courts have evaluated the strength of 
each category standing alone. 103 If an individual study within a species of 
Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1 245, 1250--60 (NJ. 1 999) (rejecting the learned intermediary rule 
where the drug was directly advertised to patients); William A. Dreier, Direct-To-Consumer Adver­
tising Liability: An Empty Gift to Plaintiffs, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 806 (2000) (arguing that the 
New Jersey rejection of the learned intermediary rule in cases of direct advertising will not broaden 
plaintiffs' rights to recover). What standard should be used to determine whether a risk is suffi­
ciently material so as to warrant disclosure to the physician is the subject of this section. 
96. See supra djscussion accompanying notes 1 2-15,  as to why pre-marketing tests for effi-
cacy and safety cannot establish that a product will cause no harm. 
97. See sources cited supra note 49. 
98. See, e.g. , Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1 194, 1 199 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2002). 
99. The limitations of such reports are well-recognized, but they serve a critical warning 
function, and may point to an unreasonable risk, especially if other types of data support the same 
conclusion. Fewer reports will be needed the rarer the event. Id. It is sobering to note that the causal 
relationship between asbestos and lung cancer had been established in Germany by 1943, but that no 
scientific consensus existed on this issue in the United States until 1 964. An article that examined 
1 04 papers or writings that were published through 1965 concluded that at least part of the problem 
was that case reports were "given little weight." See Philip E. Enterline, Changing Attitudes and 
Opinions Regarding Asbestos and Cancer 1934-1965, 20 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 685, 694 ( 199 1 ). 
1 00. See, e.g., Rider, 295 F.3d at 1 200-01 .  
1 0 1 .  See, e.g., Bourne ex rel. Bourne v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 1 89 F. Supp. 2 d  482 
(S.D. W. Va. 2002) ("courts have overwhelmingly found unreliable the methodology of extrapolat­
ing human teratogenicity from in vivo and in vitro tests"), aff'd, 85 Fed. Appx. 964 (4th Cir. 2004). 
1 02. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 3 1 8  F. Supp. 2d 879, 897 
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (finding that there was inconclusive epidemiology as to whether breast implants 
coated with polyurethane caused breast cancer). 
1 03 .  The problem of examining each study standing alone to determine whether it supports a 
finding of causation was raised by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion to General Electric Co. 
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 1 36, 152-53 ( 1 997). He notes: 
[Plaintiffs experts) did not suggest that any one study provided adequate support for their 
conclusions, but instead relied on all the studies taken together (along with their interviews of 
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evidence is found to be weak, such as a particular epidemiological or toxico­
logical study, it is faulted as not providing a reliable basis for the expert's 
opinion. After excluding the studies one by one, the court rejects the ex­
pert's opinion for failing to meet the Daubert criteria. Courts rarely ask 
whether the information in toto is probative on the issue of causation. It is 
debatable whether this fragmented approach to admitting expert proof on 
causation is justified, but we doubt that anyone would countenance a frag­
mented approach to risk evaluation. Indeed, it is only when you put together 
all the evidence from all the sources that one can divine whether a risk is 
sufficiently significant that it should be the subject of an informed choice 
warning. 
That all forms of data must be considered in order to assess risk is not 
only mandated by fundamental principles of tort law but is also grounded in 
good science. Several years ago the FDA requested that the Institute of 
Medicine and the National Research Council of the National Academies 
undertake a study to set forth guidelines for evaluating the safety of dietary 
Joiner and their review of his medical records). The District Court, however, examined the 
studies one by one and concluded that none was sufficient to show a link between PCB's [sic] 
and lung cancer. The focus of the opinion was on the separate studies and the conclusions of 
the experts, not on the experts' methodology . . . . 
Unlike the District Court, the Court of Appeals expressly decided that a "weight of the evi­
dence" methodology was scientifically acceptable. To this extent, the Court of Appeals' 
opinion is persuasive. It is not intrinsically "unscientific" for experienced professionals to ar­
rive at a conclusion by weighing all available scientific evidence-this is not the sort of ·�unk 
science" with which Daubert was concerned. 
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted); see also the Parlodel cases cited supra note 69. In these cases, 
in which the courts found that plaintiff's experts did not meet the Daubert criteria, they appeared to 
consider each category of scientific evidence separately and showed no inclination to evaluate all the 
evidence to determine whether the experts' opinions taken together established causation. See, e.g., 
Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 289 F.3d 1 193, 1216  n.2 1 (10th Cir. 2002). For example, the 
Tenth Circuit stated: 
The Hollanders also suggest that a totality of the circumstances approach establishes that there 
are controverted issues of material fact. In essence they maintain that even though each indi­
vidual category of evidence may be insufficient, all of the evidence considered as a whole 
raises factual questions as to whether Parlodel caused her stroke. The Hollanders cite no legal 
authority in support of this approach, and in our view, this argument is inconsistent with 
Daubert. To suggest that those individual categories of evidence deemed unreliable by the dis­
trict court may be added to form a reliable theory would be to abandon "the level of 
intellectual rigor" of the expert in the field. 
Id. (citation omitted). The systemic nature of this trend toward fractionalization of causation testi­
mony to decide whether the Daubert criteria have been met is noted by Finley, supra note 1 1 , at 
353, in her discussion of Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996) (holding 
that expert testimony that silicone breast implant caused various auto-immune diseases did not meet 
Daubert test). But see In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 
1248 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (finding that "cumulative effect . . .  satisfies the mandate of Daubert"); 
Jerome P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for Medical Testimony, 
288 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1 382, 1 383-84 (2002) (discussing the epidemiologist's perspective and 
concluding: "In the final analysis, assessment of evidence and causal inferences depend on accumu­
lating all potentially relevant evidence and making a subjective judgment about the strength of the 
evidence."). 
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supplements. 104 The FDA has no authority to regulate dietary supplements 
before they are marketed. It can only take action against a manufacturer of a 
dietary supplement if it can show that the supplement (or its dietary ingredi­
ents) "presents a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury under 
conditions of use recommended or suggested in labeling." 105 In a 2004 report 
entitled Dietary Supplements: A Framework for Evaluating Safety, the 
committee charged by the FDA with the task of defining when the threshold 
triggering a need for regulation has been met concluded that no single crite­
rion could adequately be used to determine whether a risk was "significant 
or unreasonable."w6 The entire gamut of data from all sources must be gar­
nered and evaluated. Thus, in vitro studies, animal testing results, Adverse 
Reaction Reports, chemical structural similarity, as well as epidemiological 
studies that suggest a weak association between the toxic agent and an ad­
verse reaction may in combination lead one to conclude that the supposed 
benefits of the dietary supplement do not warrant the risks attendant to its 
use. w7 The report makes it clear that proof of causality or harm is not neces­
sary for the determination that risk is significant or unreasonable. w8 
Furthermore, in evaluating and integrating the signals that point to a ma­
terial risk, courts should bear in mind that they are not deciding whether the 
risk was significant enough to warrant forceful or drastic action by the FDA 
such as requiring black box warnings or removing the drug from the market. 
All a court need decide is whether the signs of risk and their potential grav­
ity were sufficiently strong to require a drug manufacturer to alert 
physicians so they in tum can provide information to patients that will en­
able them to make a meaningful choice. 
In addition, in determining whether a risk was material, courts should 
also consider evidence that a defendant willfully failed to disclose informa­
tion that pertains to risks posed by its product. Traditional evidentiary 
principles permit negative inferences to be drawn from party admissions and 
evasive or destructive behavior. For example, a court should consider 
whether the defendant ( 1) failed to inform the medical community about the 
results of negative clinical drug trials, 109 (2) brushed off physicians' inquiries 
1 04. INST. OF MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR EVALUATING SAFETY 1 -2 (2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309091 101/html 
(last visited July 19, 2005). 
105. 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(l )(A)(i) (2001 ). 
I 06. INST. OF MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note I 04. 
1 07.  Id. at 255-56 ("[A]vailable evidence from each category of data, by itself, may be insuf­
ficient to indicate concern, but when a pattern of mechanistically related adverse effects is observed 
across two or more categories in a consistent manner, this can establish biological plausibility and 
warrant heightened concern for potential harmful effects in humans."); see also Joiner, 522 U.S. at 
522 n.4, and discussion in accompanying text (in which Justice Stevens notes that the Environ­
mental Protection Agency gathers material from a host of sources to assess risks). 
108. INST. OF MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 106, at 12 ("Proof of causality 
or proof of harm is not necessary to determine unreasonable or significant risk."). 
1 09. The prevalence of such conduct has led to demands by the leading medical journals for 
registries of clinical trials, and the introduction of legislation to this effect. See Kay Dickersin & 
Drummond Rennie, Registering Clinical Trials, 290 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 5 16, 5 1 9  (2003) ("There is 
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about the safety of the product even though it knew that the FDA was con­
sidering whether to remove the drug from the market, 1 10 (3) distributed 
internal memoranda expressing fears about problems with the drug,1 1 1 or (4) 
made advertising claims about the product's lack of side effects at a time 
when it was receiving reports to the contrary. 1 1 2 Admittedly, there is little 
social utility in providing information that is so tentative and unreliable that 
it will serve no purpose other than to frighten patients who need the drug 
away from its use. On the other hand, where the drug has little therapeutic 
value and provides only aesthetic or palliative relief but the risk is substan­
tial, the balance in favor of disclosure shifts dramatically. 
One could simply analogize to the law of informed consent that bases 
the standard of materiality on whether a reasonable doctor would disclose 
the risk, or whether a reasonable patient would consider the risk relevant in 
deciding whether to take the drug. 1 13 Critics of the physician-based standard 
for informed consent decry the delegation of an important autonomy deci­
sion to the custom of the medical profession. 1 14 However, since the issue in 
the drug cases is not whether the doctor was negligent, but rather whether 
the pharmaceutical manufacturers failed to provide physicians with adequate 
risk information, deferring to the medical profession has substantial advan­
tages. Doctors are likely to ally themselves with the interests of patients and 
demand that relevant risk data be shared with them. 1 15 However, being 
evidence that many industry trials are never published . . . .  Because there is commercial advantage 
to be gained by early publication of positive results and the suppression of negative results, industry 
reluctance to publish negative findings would not come as a surprise."). 
1 10. See Nelson v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 288 F.3d 954, 959 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that 
plaintiff asked her doctor to check whether Parlodel could have caused her post-partum stroke; 
Parlodel sales representative told doctor that strokes did not occur more frequently with patients 
taking Parlodel than those in the general post-partum population, but did not tell him that more than 
six months before plaintiff was prescribed Parlodel the FDA had requested the defendant to remove 
the drug from the market as a lactation suppressant and that Sandoz had refused; a second doctor 
whom plaintiff consulted was also unable to find any information that Parlodel posed a risk). For an 
extensive discussion of the lengthy negotiations between the FDA and the defendant that ultimately 
led to Parlodel's removal from the market, see Eve v. Sandoz ?harms. Corp., No. IP 98-1 429-C-Y/S, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 453 1 ,  at * 1 0-40 (S.D. Ind. March 7, 200 1 ). 
1 1 1 . Internal company documents and e-mails leaked to the Wall Street Journal suggest that 
Merck knew of problems with Vioxx by 2000. See Anna Wilde Matthews & Barbara Martinez, £­
Mails Suggest Merck Knew Vzoxx's Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1 ,  2004, at A l .  
1 1 2.  See Desiano v. Warner-Lambert Co., 326 F.3d 339, 342 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that al­
though Warner-Lambert was claiming in advertisements that Rezulin, a drug for diabetes, had 
"[s]ide [e]ffects [c]omparable to [p]lacebo," in fact "its own clinical trial data showed Rezulin users 
were three to six times more likely to suffer liver injury than patients taking the placebo"). 
1 1 3.  See supra discussion accompanying notes 82-83. 
1 14. See sources cited supra note 83. 
1 15 .  Pressure o n  physicians t o  prescribe particular drugs t o  their patients has increased enor­
mously. Direct advertising by pharmaceutical companies to consumers now totals $3.8 billion, 
leading patients to demand prescriptions for products they have heard about through ad campaigns 
and from surfing the Internet. Stuart Elliott, With or Without Vzoxx, Drug Ads Proliferate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, at C 17. In order to withstand such appeals, a doctor needs detailed information 
about drugs that pose the threat of a substantial risk. A physician cannot function as the learned 
intermediary who shields the patient from harm unless he or she is kept abreast of current data. 
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professionally trained to assess risk, they will not be prone to deem highly 
speculative risk as worthy of disclosure. 
Finally, courts will have to remain alert to the danger of allowing junk 
science to enter the courtroom door. But, unlike in the Daubert causation 
cases, they will be looking at the totality of evidence of risk and asking 
themselves whether it is sufficiently probative to warrant a warning. There is 
no magic bullet that will insure that a case based on tentative and unreliable 
data will not find its way to a j ury. Judicial vigilance will be necessary, but 
courts mindful that they are passing on materiality to support a cause of ac­
tion that does not require proof of traditional causation should be up to the 
task of ferreting out unworthy and frivolous claims. 
IV. FORMULATING A REMEDY FOR THE DEPRIVATION OF CHOICE 
Formulating a remedy for the deprivation of choice is no easy matter. 
Case law is sparse on this issue. Plaintiffs have not pursued pure informed 
choice claims decoupled from injury-causation. They have almost always 
coupled their claims for violation of informed choice in both medical mal­
practice and products liability with proof that the unwarned-of risk was 
actually caused by the therapeutic intervention or the drug that the plaintiff 
ingested. Courts have had no difficulty awarding the full range of compensa­
tory damages based on the adverse result. 1 16 On reflection, there are two 
forms of damages that foster either the corrective justice or efficiency goals 
of the law of torts. First, the failure to inform patients about material risks 
invades the right of autonomous decisionmaking, and could give rise to 
damages for dignitary harm. Second, a plaintiff who is subjected to a mate­
rial risk and suffers from the very harm that should have been warned 
against, may experience serious mental anguish from the fact that the patient 
must live with the reality that the harm may have been avoidable. Even 
though courts ultimately decline to find causation because epidemiological 
studies demonstrate that the likelihood of causation is extremely low in the 
population of persons exposed, that does not prove an absence of causation 
with regard to each individual in the group. 1 17 Epidemiology does not deal 
with individuals, and does not claim that studies showing a lack of adverse 
effects to the population being studied prove that the particular substance 
can never cause harm to anyone. In the Bendectin cases, for example, it is 
impossible to rule out that the morning sickness remedy is a mild teratogen 
that contributed to birth defects in some indeterminate number of cases in 
which the causal effect was too low to be detected. A mother who used the 
drug and whose child is deformed may therefore experience lifelong regret. 
This form of human anguish is no small matter and does not depend on 
1 16. See supra note 89. 
1 1 7 .  Green et  al., supra note 35,  at  337 ("[E]mploying the results of group-based studies of 
risk to make a causal determination for an individual plaintiff is beyond the limits of epidemiol­
ogy."). 
November 2005] Uncertainty and Informed Choice 28 1 
proof that the drug actually caused the harm. It is quite sufficient that the 
material risk may have been responsible for the harm. 
One might consider the possibility of awarding damages based on the 
increased risk that plaintiff was subjected to by taking the drug. 1 1 8 Whether 
recovery for proportional causation should be recognized outside of the 
medical malpractice arena is a subject of some debate. 1 19 However, even if 
theoretically one could consider some reduced proportional recovery for 
informed choice cases based on increased risk, it is not a practical option. 
We have been proceeding on the premise that epidemiological studies that 
accurately reflect increased risk are not likely to be readily available. As 
noted earlier, to commission studies for litigation purposes of low probabil­
ity risks may be prohibitively expensive and, in some instances, ethically 
unallowable. 120 The non-epidemiological evidence which may support a duty 
1 1 8. Several authors have advocated recognizing an independent right for the deprivation of 
choice. See Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncenainty and Causation in Ton Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 
101 1 ,  1 0 1 7-21 (200 1 ); Porat & Stein, supra note 6, at 1 89 1 .  Professor Geistfeld correctly identifies 
the need to recognize a right for the deprivation of autonomous choice but does not analyze the issue 
in light of the rather substantial body of case law dealing with informed choice. Furthermore, Geist­
feld concludes that once "the plaintiff has established a tortious invasion of her autonomy interest 
. . . .  [ w ]hether the product tortiously caused the plaintiff's [injury] therefore involves a question of 
damages rather than of liability." Geistfeld, supra, at 1 01 8 ,  I 02 1-22. He then suggests that the evi­
dentiary standard for assessing damages for the physical injury that followed the deprivation of 
choice be relaxed so that plaintiff can recover some damages. Id. at 102 1 .  Ultimately, Geistfeld 
retracts his autonomy argument by seeking to value its deprivation by some measure of physical 
injury damages. Professors Porat and Stein deal with the issue of uncertainty in tort litigation in a 
very different manner. They argue that evidential uncertainty resulting from defendant's wrongdoing 
deprives the plaintiff of her ability to prosecute her case and deprives her of her autonomous choices 
in enforcing her legal rights. Porat & Stein, supra note 6, at 1 894. They would value the uncertainty 
created by the defendant's fault by assessing the market value of the missing information. Id. at 
1926--27. The threat posed by a potential lawsuit and its settlement value can be monetized by treat­
ing the missing information as an asset that the plaintiff is willing to sell and the defendant is 
prepared to buy off for the right price. Id. It is clear that although Porat and Stein propose to value 
autonomy, they do not seek to value the right to choice in and of itself. They treat uncertainty in the 
context of awarding damages for a discounted value of the outcome of the trial for physical dam­
ages. Id. This Article does not predicate the awarding of damages on the wrongful conduct of the 
defendant in failing to develop adequate information nor does it tie recovery to the physical dam­
ages that plaintiff suffered. It values autonomy for its own sake and· seeks to compensate the plaintiff 
for damages brought about because the plaintiff was not informed of the uncertain risks. For a cri­
tique of the Porat and Stein thesis, see Vern R. Walker, Uncenainties in Ton Liability for 
Uncenainty, I LAW, PROBABILITY & RtsK 1 7 5  (2002). See also Stephen R. Perry, Protected Interests 
and Undenakings in the Law of Negligence, 42 U. TORONTO L.J., 247, 290-91 ( 1992) (arguing that 
lost chance should be taken into account in valuing the deprivation of the opportunity to follow a 
preferable course of action). 
Also see Twerski & Cohen, supra note 80, at 648--62. The authors argue for the recognition of 
a cause of action for the deprivation of the right to make an autonomous choice separate and apart 
from physical injury and explore several options for valuing the right. 
1 1 9. For a comprehensive review and analysis of the judicial and scholarly community deal­
ing with the proper utilization of the lost chance theory of recovery, see David A. Fischer, Ton 
Recovery For Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605 (2001).  See also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 26 cmt.h (Tentative Draft 
No. 2, 2002). One of the authors has taken the position that when excellent statistical data supports a 
showing of increased risk, proportional causation may be appropriate. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil 
B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 
Nw. U.L. REV. 1 ,  24-3 1 ( 1999). 
1 20. See cases cited supra note 56. 
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to give a plaintiff an informed· choice will not provide the hard data neces­
sary to support a recovery based on proportional causation. 
A. Dignitary Tort Damages 
It would seem only fair that a plaintiff who ingested a drug that was not 
accompanied with adequate information about risks that she should have 
been informed of should at least be entitled to dignitary tort damages. The 
law of torts provides such compensation for assault, battery and false im­
prisonment without regard to whether the plaintiff suffered physical harm. 12 1  
However, dignitary rights are primarily protected when the defendant has 
acted intentionally to invade the well-recognized right of personal security. 
On occasion, dignitary rights receive some recognition through the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The strictures of that tort are 
such that even if a drug manufacturer were to be found to have intentionally 
failed to disclose information about uncertain risks, a cause of action could 
not be maintained. Courts demand that to make out a prima facie case the 
plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct was "extreme and out­
rageous." 122 In the case of failing to provide information with regard to 
uncertain risk, it is highly unlikely that such conduct would rise to the level 
that it could be labeled "extreme and outrageous." When the defendant acts 
negligently, the law of torts does not protect dignitary rights. Thus, for ex­
ample, a plaintiff may recover damages for the intentional tort of assault. 
There is, however, no cause of action for negligent assault. 1 23 To recover, 
plaintiff would have to seek to invoke the tort of negligent infliction of men­
tal distress. That cause of action brings along with it considerable baggage. 
Some courts do not recognize it at all and others limit the cause of action in 
a variety of ways. 124 We shall explore the action for mental distress in the 
ensuing section. 
B .  Damages for the Anguish of Choice Deprivation 
A cause of action for emotional distress arising from the failure to di­
vulge material risk information that deprives a patient of informed choice 
presents a theory of recovery that could result in significant damages to 
plaintiffs. 125 As noted earlier, there is little direct authority on this issue. 
However, fairly recently the New Jersey Supreme Court struggled with the 
1 2 1 .  DOBBS, supra note 60, § 42. 
1 22. Id. §§ 303--06. 
1 23. KEETON ET AL.,  supra note 59, § 1 0. 
124. DOBBS, supra note 60, § 308. 
1 25 .  For a n  early article suggesting recovery for emotional distress where uncertainty pre­
vents a plaintiff from establishing traditional causation, see Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61  GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 1 36 ( 1 992). See also Lisa Heinzerling & Cameron Powers Hoffman, Tortious Toxics, 
26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y REV. 67 (2001 )  (positing that recovery be allowed for negli­
gent infliction of emotional distress based on the dread associated with exposure to toxic 
substances). 
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problem. In Canesi v. Wilson,126 plaintiff consulted Dr. Wilson, an obstetri­
cian, concerned that she might be pregnant because she was amenorrheic for 
eleven days. Dr. Wilson took a urine sample and concluded that she was not 
pregnant. He then prescribed Provera, a progestational agent designed to 
induce menstruation. At the time she took the Provera there was a warning 
in the Physicians' Desk Reference ("PDR") that if a woman was taking 
Provera while she was pregnant, she should be advised that there was a risk 
that the fetus would suffer from congenital anomalies, including limb reduc­
tion. Two weeks later, Dr. Wilson gave plaintiff a blood serum test to 
determine if she was pregnant. This time the test was positive. Plaintiff 
asked Dr. Wilson if the Provera she had been taking could have a deleterious 
effect on a fetus and he told her not to worry. Plaintiff saw another physi­
cian, Dr. Lowe, and told him that she had taken Provera during the first 
month of pregnancy. He, too, told her not to worry about injury to the fetus. 
Plaintiff gave birth to a child born with bilateral limb reduction. Ultimately, 
it turned out that there was no evidence that Provera caused limb reduction, 
and a later version of the PDR dropped the limb reduction warning. It re­
mains true, however, that Provera can cause congenital anomalies. 
Plaintiff sued both doctors for failing to provide her with information 
about the risks associated with taking Provera during pregnancy. She 
claimed that had she known of the risk of congenital defects generally, or 
limb reduction specifically, she would have terminated the pregnancy. De­
fendants moved for summary judgment contending that since plaintiff could 
not prove that Provera caused the child's limb reduction, she had not proved 
"medical causation" and hence the plaintiff could not make out an action for 
lack of informed consent. 127 The trial court granted the defense motion and 
was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court. 128 The New Jersey Su­
preme Court reversed, finding that the plaintiff's claim for lack of informed 
consent could not stand, but that her claim for wrongful birth should not 
have been dismissed.129 
The court engaged in a lengthy discussion comparing the elements of an 
informed consent case and those of one predicated on wrongful birth, 
brought by parents claiming that, had they been properly warned, the mother 
would have aborted the fetus. Both causes of action are predicated on a 
plaintiff's right to self-determination. The difference between the two is that 
"because damages in informed consent cases include the harm or physical 
injury to the patient, there must be medical causation, that is, a causal con­
nection between the undisclosed risk and the injury ultimately sustained."130 
Thus, the plaintiff must show that: "(1) [a] prudent patient would have re­
fused consent if full and adequate disclosure had been made, and (2) [the] 
1 26. 730 A.2d 805 (N.J. 1999). 
1 27.  Id. at 8 10. 
1 28. Canesi v. Wilson, 685 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), modified, 730 A.2d 805 
(N.J. 1999). 
1 29. Canesi, 730 A.2d at 8 1 2-13. 
130. Id. at 8 1 2  (citing Grasser v. Kitzis, 553 A.2d 346 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1988)). 
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injury suffered was related to [the medical intervention] and did not occur 
spontaneously or by independent means."131 The court said that these two 
elements must be made out in cases that involve the prescription of drugs as 
well. 132 In sharp distinction, the court argued that in the wrongful birth case 
the plaintiff's claim is not for the birth defect of the child. Instead, it is 
"whether the doctors' inadequate disclosure deprived the parents of their 
deeply personal right to decide for themselves whether to give birth to a 
child who could possibly be afflicted with a physical abnormality." 133 It is 
for "their own mental and emotional anguish at having lost the opportunity 
to decide for themselves whether or not to terminate the pregnancy."134 
The New Jersey Supreme Court thus concluded that the plaintiff's claim 
for informed consent seeking to recover damages for the limb reduction 
failed because there was insufficient evidence to establish medical causation 
and upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant on 
this issue. 135 As to the wrongful birth claim, the court held that the plaintiff 
was entitled to recover: ( 1) "special medical expenses attributable to raising 
a child with a congenital impairment" and (2) "the emotional injury attribut­
able to the deprivation of 'the option to accept or reject a parental 
relationship with the child.' " 136 On this count the court overruled the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for defendant and remanded for a new 
trial. 
It should be obvious that the crucial distinction is not between informed 
consent and wrongful birth. As noted earlier, both claims seek to vindicate 
the right to self-determination and autonomy. The reason that the court 
found that the informed consent case fails and that the wrongful birth case 
can succeed is that the plaintiff in the informed consent case seeks damages 
for the physical injury caused by the failure to provide the information (in­
jury-causation); whereas in the wrongful birth case the plaintiff eschews 
seeking damages for the birth defect and seeks only to vindicate the right to 
informed choice (decision-causation). It is interesting that in the wrongful 
birth case the court allows recovery both for the deprivation of the right to 
choose and the special medical expenses of raising a child with a congenital 
impairment. Allowing for these special expenses, however, logically follows 
from the conclusion that the mother would have aborted the fetus and would 
thus not have had to encounter these expenses. Having established decision­
causation, her entitlement to special damages is unexceptional. 
The analogy from the wrongful birth case to our paradigm case is almost 
exact. Just as a woman is entitled to recover for her "own mental and emo­
tional anguish" for having lost the opportunity to decide whether she wished 
1 3 1 .  Id. 
1 32. Id. 
1 33. Id. at 818. 
1 34. Id. at 8 1 3-14. 
135.  Id. 
1 36. Id. at 819 (citations omitted). 
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to give birth to a child who could possibly be afflicted with a physical ab­
normality, so she should be entitled to recover for the emotional damages 
for having lost the opportunity to decide whether she wishes to take an anti­
nausea drug that might cause serious birth defects or an anti-lactation drug 
that has a material risk of causing a stroke. That medical causation cannot 
be established should not be dispositive in either case. We thus advocate a 
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when plaintiff is 
deprived of an informed choice about material risk even if the causation of 
the actual physical injury cannot be established with the certainty demanded 
by traditional causation norms. We would expect that the greater the materi­
ality of the risk, the greater the damages assessed against the defendant. And 
we would also expect that greater damages would be assessed if it were 
found that a defendant acted in bad faith in refusing to reveal material risk 
information. The sense of betrayal and hurt suffered by a plaintiff deprived 
of meaningful choice cannot be divorced from the conduct of the defendant 
who was responsible for the deprivation.137 
We are mindful that the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress 
is not universally recognized. Although most courts allow for the action 
without requiring proof of physical manifestations arising from the emo­
tional harm, 138 some courts still demand some form of physical harm as a 
necessary element of the cause of action. 1 39 Two very strong arguments lead 
us to believe that even the minority should recognize such a cause of action 
in the case of informed choice. First, unlike general negligence, which is not 
targeted to a specific right, the duty to provide information for informed 
choice is very specific and will not be protected unless damages for emo­
tional distress are granted. General negligent conduct regularly results in 
physical harm. Defendants cannot plan on avoiding exposure to liability. 
Drug manufacturers can, however, rely on the inability of plaintiffs to estab­
lish the very high causation threshold to escape liability. A credible deterrent 
must be put in place. Second, those courts that require objective sympto­
mology do so because they fear that emotional distress is too easily 
feigned. 140 In the cases we address, plaintiffs suffer very substantial physical 
137 .  The authors would limit the right to recovery for mental distress to cases in which the 
unwarned-of risk actually materializes. Although, theoretically, the dignitary right to informed 
choice ought to be protected whether or not the risk materializes, there are good reasons for limiting 
recovery for mental distress to cases in which a plaintiff suffers actual harm. The cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress has traditionally been bounded by limited-duty rules to 
assure that it does not spread so wide a net that plaintiffs with marginal claims are allowed to re­
cover. Thus, for example, many courts limit recovery to cases i n  which mental distress is manifested 
by physical symptoms. Bystander claims for mental distress are limited by courts to either persons 
in the zone of danger or those who witnessed the event. See DOBBS, supra note 60, §§ 308- 1 2. 
1 38. See, e.g. , Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981) ;  Molien v. Kaiser 
Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 8 1 3  (Cal. 1 980); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 
(Me. 1 982). 
1 39. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 757 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying 
Nebraska law); Dailey v. LaCroix, 1 79 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Mich. 1 970). 
140. See, e.g. , Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 1 7 1 ,  1 8 1  (Mass. 1 982); Reilly v. United 
States, 547 A.2d 894, 896 (R.I. 1988). 
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injury. The question is not whether the injury is real. That plaintiffs would 
suffer emotional distress from having been denied the right to avoid a devas­
tating injury does not raise the verifiability problems that attend many of the 
cases of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Admittedly, courts have generally been reluctant to broaden products li­
ability-related mental distress claims. Thus, for example, in Metro-North 
Commuter Railroad v. Buckley, 141 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to recog­
nize a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act based on a plaintiff's 
exposure to asbestos when the plaintiff had exhibited no physical manifesta­
tion of any asbestos-related injury. The fear that an asymptomatic plaintiff 
might develop asbestosis at some time in the future was not sufficient to 
support recovery for mental distress. But the refusal of most courts to allow 
recovery for asymptomatic asbestos plaintiffs is predicated in large part on 
their right to recovery when and if they contract some actual asbestos­
related disease. 142 In our informed choice paradigm case there is no tomor­
row. The plaintiff who was denied informed choice suffers from the very 
harm not warned against. The risk was sufficiently material so that it war­
ranted a warning. The right to choice has been inalterably denied. The 
causal connection remains clouded because of the inability to establish cau­
sation with sufficient clarity to satisfy traditional tort causation norms. 
Absent recovery for mental distress, the plaintiff remains forever without a 
remedy and drug companies need not look forward to a day of reckoning for 
their failure to provide the information necessary for autonomous choice. 
Similarly, the reluctance of some courts to allow mental distress recov­
ery for those who have been placed in fear of contracting HIV/AIDS should 
not stand in the way of recognizing a mental distress cause of action for in­
formed choice. 143 Two factors characterize the fear of AIDS cases. First, 
courts have refused to feed AIDS phobia by giving legitimacy to the view 
that any contact whatsoever with an HIV-infected person can result in trans­
fer of the HIV virus. Second, whatever mental distress is present is transient 
since blood tests can determine whether the plaintiff has contracted the HIV 
virus. In the informed choice case in which we propose recovery for mental 
distress, the materiality of the risk has been substantiated and the defendant 
has failed to provide the requisite information to the patient. The risk is any­
thing but transient. Plaintiffs live daily with the unwarned-about 
consequences and will do so for the remainder of their lives. 
1 4 1 .  5 2 1  U.S. 424, 428-32 ( 1 997). 
1 42. For a comprehensive discussion of why courts have been reluctant to allow recovery for 
asymptomatic exposure to asbestos, see James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litiga­
tion Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical 
Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REv. 8 1 5, 8 1 6-35 (2002). 
1 43. Some courts have refused to allow recovery for mental distress arising from possible 
exposure to the HIV virus whether the action is brought as an intentional tort (battery): Brzoska v. 
Olson, 668 A.2d 1 355 (Del. 1 995); Funeral Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Cmty. Hosp., 4 1 3  
S.E.2d 7 9  (W. Va. 1 99 1), or negligence: Majca v. Beeki/, 7 0 1  N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. 1 998); Carroll v. 
Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs. , Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1 993). 
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The addition of an action for informed choice would affect the method 
of resolving Daubert challenges. Currently most Daubert challenges in 
toxic tort cases come before the trial court in the form of in limine motions 
to bar a plaintiff's expert from testifying about causation. Trial judges pre­
side over extensive voir dire of the experts and then decide whether 
plaintiffs have adduced sufficient admissible evidence to warrant a trial on 
the merits. 144 As is discussed above, courts have found, in many instances 
with considerable justification, the expert opinions too weak to support tra­
ditional causation. 
If courts were to recognize an action for informed choice, the same tes­
timony offered on causation would be relevant to establishing the risk 
potential of the drug and whether the uncertain risk should have been 
warned against. There is little likelihood that plaintiffs' experts could be 
successfully challenged on their ability to assess risk. A review of the cases 
indicates that experts have rarely been challenged on their academic creden­
tials. 145 Therefore, it would be far more cost-effective and efficient for a trial 
court to defer ruling on the Daubert motion with regard to the causation 
issue until trial. 146 If, at the close of plaintiffs' case, the trial judge believed 
that the Daubert criteria were not met with regard to the case for injury­
causation, the court would grant a directed verdict for defendants on that 
issue. Plaintiffs would then be free to use the testimony of their experts to 
support their claims for lack of informed choice. 
Recognition of a causation-free informed choice cause of action in 
which the damages would be for the infliction of mental distress raises the 
possibility that plaintiffs could successfully prosecute class actions. The 
major stumbling block to class certification in product liability personal in­
jury actions has been that evidence of causation is so peculiar to the 
individual plaintiff that common issues of fact do not predominate. 147 If 
every case requires extensive testimony as to whether the defendant's prod­
uct caused the plaintiff's harm, there are few economies of scale to be 
gained by class certification. However, once medical causation is removed 
as an issue from drug cases, the only individual issue is the degree and 
144. See, e.g., Soldo v. Sandoz Phanns. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (143-
page opinion reviewing expert testimony); Eve v. Sandoz Phanns. Corp., No. IP 98-1429-C-Y/S, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531 (S.D. Ind. March 7, 2001) (extensively rehearsing the testimony of 
experts who testified in many other cases dealing with Parlodel). 
145. See, e.g., Siharath v. Sandoz Phanns. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1354-56 (N.D. Ga. 
2001) (holding that plaintiff's experts were well-qualified by education and experience to opine as 
to whether Parlodel caused plaintiff's stroke; however, their opinions did not meet Daubert criteria); 
Nelson v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 92 F. Supp. 2d 954, 968 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (holding that while 
plaintiff's expert was a highly qualified professor, his opinion as to whether Cordarone caused plain­
tiff to lose his eyesight did not meet Daubert criteria). 
146. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (holding that a court has 
discretion "to avoid unnecessary 'reliability' proceedings . . .  [when] the reliability of an expert's 
methods is properly taken for granted"). 
147. See, e.g. , In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that individual 
medical causation issues destroy commonality and hence prevent class certification); Liggett Group 
Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 444-46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that medical causation is 
inherently individualized and thus not subject to class certification). 
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extent of the plaintiff's mental upset. Once liability for failure to warn is 
established, remand of the issue of damages alone for individual trials will 
not undermine the predominance requirement. The damages issue is so nar­
row and focused that even if the cases are not settled, the trials are likely to 
be short and subject to quick resolution. 
CONCLUSION 
The current state of Daubert drug litigation is intolerable. Cases in 
which plaintiffs fall short of being able to meet the demanding criteria es­
tablished for the admissibility of expert testimony on causation are deemed 
to have no merit whatsoever. That a toxic drug cannot be proven to have 
definitively caused a harm does not mean that plaintiffs should be deprived 
of the right to choose whether they wish to subject themselves to the mate­
rial risk of that harm actually taking place. When the undisclosed risk 
actually occurs, plaintiffs have a legitimate claim that they must live their 
lives with a result that might have been avoided had they been properly in­
formed. The sense of betrayal is greatest when a drug is prescribed not for 
therapeutic purposes, but rather, for aesthetic or palliative relief. 
We are aware that there is no bright line that can be drawn between life­
style and therapeutic drugs. 148 Nonetheless, the distinction is important as a 
beginning point in recognizing a cause of action for informed choice. In the 
former, the issue of decision-causation, that is, whether the plaintiff would 
have chosen against taking the drug if informed of the possible serious side 
effects, is much clearer. The decision-causation question is much more diffi­
cult in the case of drugs that have important therapeutic properties. 149 At this 
stage, we need not resolve the outer reaches of a causation-free informed 
choice drug case. It is sufficient that we outline the broad strokes of such a 
1 48. How, for instance, should the COX-2 inhibitors be classified? They do not cure underly­
ing disease but alleviate pain and perhaps outperform other considerably cheaper drugs in 
preventing annoying, but sometimes extremely dangerous, perhaps fatal, gastrointestinal effects. It is 
possible that a combination of considerably cheaper and safer drugs would have had the same bene­
ficial effects. There will certainly be issues about causation-not only over which COX-2 inhibitors 
can cause cardiovascular harm, but also about the circumstances in which they do so. Questions 
about dosage, latency, and underlying disease will certainly be raised even with regard to Vioxx, 
which Merck took off the market for causing an excess of strokes and heart attacks. It appears that 
neither physicians nor consumers were provided with adequate information to make an informed 
choice about using other drugs to relieve pain without the danger of gastrointestinal distress. 
1 49. Where a drug has significant therapeutic value, the question of whether a patient prop­
erly informed of uncertain risks would have taken the drug if warned of them is highly complex. 
One of the authors has explored this issue at length in Twerski & Cohen, supra note 80. In that 
article, the authors examine decision-causation in the context of medical malpractice informed con­
sent and conclude that there exists no credible model for determining what decision a patient would 
have made if informed of difficult choices between different therapeutic interventions, each present­
ing countervailing risks and benefits. It is for this reason that we have chosen to limit our proposal 
to lifestyle drugs where the decision-causation issue is more easily subject to resolution. Thus, we 
have little doubt that a woman in her first trimester of pregnancy faced with choosing between the 
discomfort of nausea and the uncertain risk of birth defects from a drug that would alleviate the 
symptoms would choose not to take the drug. 
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cause of action. Mrs. Mekdeci was right. 150 Whether Bendectin caused her 
child's limb reduction will never be known. But she has had to live with the 
agony that her child's deformity might have been avoided had she not taken 
Bendectin in the first trimester of her pregnancy. It was her choice to decide 
whether she wished to suffer the discomfort of nausea or take the chance 
that her child might be born with a birth defect caused by the drug. That 
choice was unjustly taken from her. No one has responded to her anguished 
cry that she was betrayed. We now do so. 
1 50. See Mekdeci Deposition, supra note I .  
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